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Introduction  
What policy value might derive from analyzing the recent experience of Liberia with interim 
governments as conflict management and institution building agents? The Liberian case provides 
a window into a set of factors that exist in a number of countries—fragile regimes that “govern” 
resource-rich economies—that could potentially lead to state erosion and failure in many 
countries with these same features:  
1. First, Liberia is the prototypical weak state eroded first by privilege, and subsequently by 
ambitious individuals whose use of armed gangs brought down the state.  
2. Second, Liberia, along with Sierra Leone, provides an optic on contemporary warlord 
politics as a condition with its own specifiable properties and political economy.  
3. Third, Liberia’s disintegration, its civil war, the interim governments and its future 
governance arrangements are intimately tied to subregional politics (the Mano River 
Basin).  
4. Finally, Liberia’s experience with regional peacekeepers and regional economic 
arrangements provides both cautionary tales and positive precedents with respect to 
state-building, governance, stability and legitimacy.  
Overall, explaining how and why the Liberian state failed, and the challenges and opportunities 
faced by the international community as it sought to reconstitute a viable Liberian regime, 
therefore hold lessons for many countries in similar situations. 
Origins of the Liberian State and the Seeds of State Failure  
The factors that led to the civil war that devastated Liberia in the 1990s were intimately tied to the 
creation of the country in 1847. Liberia is an artifact of the emigration of “free” American slaves to 
Africa under the agency of the American Colonization Society. Described as “an alternative to 
abolition,” this movement began in the 1820s, culminating in a settler “republic” in 1847.[1] Over 
the next hundred years the coastal settlers evolved into a tightly knit community of privilege, 
which historically has sat uneasily on top of the majority indigenous population. The Americo-
Liberians, as they came to be called, governed a unitary sovereign state through which they 
variously fought, exploited and, to an extent, co-opted the indigenous people in the countryside. 
Power and wealth were extremely concentrated: a few families controlled great quantities of land: 
the 20 largest Liberian logging concessions covered 8500 sq miles, while 3,000 independent 
private rubber estates (15% of territory) turned local inhabitants into laborers, dependent on those 
families. By the 1940s political and economic power reposed in roughly 300 families of Americo-
Liberians who had few ties to the indigenous population other than those of economic exploitation.  
In the mid-twentieth century, William Tubman served as the president of the sovereign Republic 
of Liberia. His great power derived from his role as godfather/broker to the elite families, his 
control over both the Liberian Frontier Force (LFF, an internal security force) and public revenues, 
and a singular political organization, the True Whig Party, which he used to manage national 
affairs from 1944 to his death in 1971. Government and businesses were dominated by a “circle 
of relatives, other Americo-Liberian families, and more recent local assimilated tribal entrants in 
this ‘honorable’ class.”[2] 
Such limited rule could not last forever, however. By the 1960s, no longer able to contain 
aspirations for greater participation, especially given the wholesale expansion of political 
independence of all his neighbors along the West African littoral, Tubman was forced to open up 
the system. In that regard new county jurisdictions were established binding the countryside to 
the coast in the same political-administrative framework. The extension of the franchise to 
indigenous people along with greatly expanded educational opportunities combined to create a 
slightly more inclusive society, at least at the margins.[3] 
Yet in a dynamic similar to that found across Latin America and Southern Europe, these reforms 
only served to evoke more expansive ambitions of younger people in Tubman’s own class. His 
successor in 1971, William R. Tolbert, was cross-pressured by the conservative elites who 
wanted to extend the privileges of their own progeny. They induced him to privatize more 
communal land to generate export income. While this served the intended purpose of extending 
opportunities for already powerful elites, it also ejected indigenous farmers from their land, further 
alienating the masses from the political and economic elite. The Tolbert government continued to 
turn a blind eye to the low wages paid to both rural and urban labor, leaving the majority with a 
mean, subsistence existence. 
These conditions were well noted by local intellectuals and professionals, returning overseas 
graduates and local youth. They were well informed of how politics and government had changed 
among the neighboring states in the 1960s and 70s, were steeped in the rhetoric of liberation that 
had spawned liberation movements across Africa, and were motivated by the rhetoric of equality 
and human rights that accompanied the decolonization of Africa. Accordingly two organizations 
emerged in the 1970s that offered a modest challenge to the monopoly on authority enjoyed by 
the True Whig Party and the Tolbert government: the Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA) 
which advocated for social justice, rule of law and democratization generally; and the Progressive 
Alliance of Liberians (PAL) which focused more specifically on multiparty electoral competition.[4] 
While Tubman had been able to balance competing demands, and therefore to insulate his 
powerbase from challenges, Tolbert failed to develop such skills and failed to maintain a 
consistent response to the dual challenges of meeting the demands of his supporters while 
pacifying the masses. Therefore, economic and political agitation soon began to spiral out of 
control, with demands focusing on the introduction of a multiparty democratic political process, 
including electoral reform. These demands peaked in the late 1970s at a time of economic 
decline, in part due to the cost of petroleum product imports.[5] 
Events came to a head in April 1979, when in response to a 50 per cent increase in the price of a 
bag of rice the Progressive Alliance of Liberians (PAL) called for a protest march. The police 
overreacted, started shooting into the crowd and killed “somewhere between 40 and 140,” 
wounding an “additional 400.”[6] The Tolbert government became so rattled that it asked 
neighboring Guinea to intervene to restore order. With 700 Guinean troops patrolling the streets, 
MIG planes flying overhead, the arrest and subsequent charges of treason of PAL leaders and 
other political dissidents, the closure of the university, the government played a very heavy hand 
in crushing a protest that it had precipitated through its own policies.  
The Doe Interlude: From Lumpen Military to Armed Gangs  
These events revealed the government’s vulnerability. Tolbert’s vacillation between a personal 
instinct to try to manage reform and his overriding need to appease the old Whig aristocracy (who 
consistently demanded the use of sticks without carrots) left him appearing weak to all sides. 
Almost one year later to the day, April 12, 1980, Sergeant Samuel K. Doe and a few other 
noncommissioned officers from the Liberian military staged a successful coup d’etat, seizing 
power and summarily executing William Tolbert and 13 former government officials. Though 
these events were stunning in themselves, they also represented a profound break with the past: 
“[A]lthough the president could not fully control events or the settler group, he had become the 
Indispensable Man with respect to the survival of the caste relationship. When the president 
fell…the entire structure of dominance fell with him.”[7] As the indigenous Liberians seized power, 
a century old “settler” oligarchy came to an end, and with it the “end of a distinct system of 
patrimonial rule.”[8]  
The Tubman and Tolbert administrations had maintained power by balancing an extensive 
patronage network, fueled by the government’s direct and indirect control over the economy 
(through relationships with business partners). Controlling the economy had always been the key 
to maintaining power in Liberia, and continued to be one of the most decisive factors shaping 
events as the new regime took shape. 
While Doe initially tried to establish a credible government with himself as the head of state, and 
even earned the loyalty of the civil service, the role of the state as the primary broker in allocating 
and managing commercial power was fading fast, and without any other source of influence and 
legitimacy, this meant that Doe was losing his mechanism to maintain power. “[C]ommercial 
operations shifted away from the heavy reliance on access to state power, and thus on 
presidential patronage, to establishing independent connections to global markets and regional 
non-state actors.”[9] The big foreign investors upon whom Doe could rely for revenue began to 
leave: the National Iron Ore Company joint venture left in 1985, Bong Mining Company (German) 
in 1988 and the Liberian American Mining Company in 1989.[10] “[F]iscal and administrative 
malfeasance tended to favor smaller, better-connected Americo-Liberian and ethnic Lebanese 
operations, which could use personal connections and capacity to conceal commerce in more 
portable and marketable resources such as timber, rubber, gold and diamonds.”[11] The 
connections of the locals were often with outlets in neighboring Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea or Sierra 
Leone. 
Further complicating the scene, Doe lacked an extensive personal network to compensate for his 
declining economic powerbase. Having come to power by overthrowing the government 
dominated by Americo-Liberians, he was isolated from their network of power and influence. 
Doe’s ethnic group came from a remote area of the country, and he was without an ethnic power 
base in the capital city to provide organizational muscle and some semblance of ethnic legitimacy. 
Since Doe had no other networks of support, especially in the capital Monrovia, he began to 
mobilize what Sawyer calls the “lumpen” military: that urban poor population that sought a living in 
the army but had no cultivated loyalty to either the mission of the national military or to any 
indigenous group.[12] With no firm ties in either the countryside or to the former Monrovia 
oligarchy, these young soldiers were easily mobilized. Doe was Krahn and did extend patronage 
to his homeland group in the southeast (Grand Gedah), yet his core support was located in these 
peers with few links to indigenous roots. In 1985 after a coup attempt by his top General, Thomas 
Qwiwonkpa, Doe purged the remaining old lineage based elements of the Liberian military, the 
Gio and Mano, who in turn retreated to the border areas of Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire (only to 
subsequently become commandos in Charles Taylor’s militia).[13] 
Doe’s hold on power was further weakened when the government organized a constitutional 
referendum in 1985. The US government had supported Liberia both financially and militarily, 
compelling the government to initiate a constitution drafting process between 1981 and 1984. 
After extensive consultation with the Liberian people, the document drafted by the Constitution 
Commission provided checks on executive authority and limited power sharing with other bodies, 
e.g., county governments. However, Doe’s government radically revised the text under a second 
stage Advisory Assembly. By the time the constitutional referendum occurred in 1984 the public 
was confused, having taken seriously the three years of consultations and assurances that their 
views were important. Thus it came to be that the 1985 election was not only tainted procedurally, 
but it conveniently restored Doe to a very autocratic Presidency.[14] 
By the late 1980s, therefore, Doe was weakened economically, politically, and in terms of 
legitimacy. He lost his foreign patron as well, as by this time the Reagan Administration had lost 
interest. Doe’s empty treasury could no longer buy him support, and those who had their own 
now privatized connections to commercial resources did not need him any longer. Thus Doe 
became isolated and vulnerable to more and more challengers during the second half of the 
1980s. Ever in search of resources he tripled public employment in five years, and began to 
pillage the state enterprises for his own purposes, e.g., running the Forestry Development 
Authority himself and the Liberian Petroleum Refining Corp for the subsidized oil imports that he, 
in turn, sold for personal profit.[15] 
Outbreak of War, Regional Intervention, and the First Interim Government  
Doe’s government was eventually overthrown by rebel forces created by someone he himself had 
put into government. In the early 1980s, Doe had promoted people with ties to the United States 
into high administrative positions. Among these individuals was Charles Taylor, whom Doe had 
appointed Director of the General Services Agency, the procurement authority for the Liberian 
government. By 1984, however, while on an official business trip to the USA, Taylor was arrested 
on Liberian charges of embezzling nearly $1 million. Mysteriously, and for reasons never 
explained, Taylor escaped from prison while awaiting extradition, and disappeared.[16] 
The scope of his ambition became clear on New Year’s Eve in 1989, when Taylor invaded Liberia 
from the north with a mixed militia of mercenaries, regional and internal supporters called the 
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). Chaos reigned in the next few months during which 
somewhere bet ween 13,000 and 20,000 people died.[17] By mid-1990 most sources agree that 
Taylor’s forces controlled 90 per cent of the country. 
Throughout this period of the war, Taylor stayed in the north, consolidating his connections with 
various private commercial interests. Taylor had taken advantage of his years in exile to visit 
Libyan training camps and network with an array of dissidents from Liberia’s neighbors. The 
economic foundations for cross-border partnerships had been established in the 1970s, when 
business partnerships moved away from government control and towards exchanges with 
partners in Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire, and Sierra Leone. Added to this, the military elements 
previously purged by Doe had originated in the border areas of Guinea and Sierra Leone, once 
again creating a marriage of military force and economic interest. In exile, Taylor brought together 
all these elements. 
When he launched his assault on Doe’s government in 1989, Taylor manipulated the 
relationships he had forged in Libya, and it is in this phase that the conflict became most 
regionalized. While in Libya, Taylor had developed a relationship with Foday Sankoh of Sierra 
Leone, who, with Taylor’s assistance, began a war against his own government to seize control 
over the rural diamond areas of Sierra Leone. Without Taylor’s early financial backing and military 
assistance, the infamous Revolutionary United Front (RUF) may not have been able to seize 
control over any areas. With Taylor’s assistance, Sankoh was able to ruthlessly mobilize 
diamonds to sell on the international market. Taylor’s investment paid off, as Sankoh provided 
both himself and Taylor the means to acquire weapons to further fuel their ambitions to seize 
power in their respective countries. 
The mix of regional nationalities involved in Taylor’s NPFL made neighboring countries nervous, 
especially the Nigerians and Ghanaians. In mid-1990 Nigeria took the lead in securing formal 
support from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to sponsor a military 
“monitoring group” (ECOMOG) made up initially of solders from Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone. 
The Nigerian foreign minister sought approval from the UN Security Council in August, though the 
move was largely a fig leaf for what was going to happen in any case.[18] The international force, 
along with the remnants of Doe’s army, thwarted the NPFL advance on the port and the capital 
city, Monrovia. 
Partisans of different groups were now diffused throughout the Mano River basin. Alhaji Kromah 
mobilized Liberians on both sides of the northwest Guinea border. A breakaway leader from 
Taylor’s NPFL, Prince Johnson, was determined to benefit from what he regarded as the three-
way contest for the post-Doe order: Taylor, ECOMOG and Johnson’s own “Independent” NPFL. 
Accordingly Johnson murdered Doe in September, making sure to record the event on tape. 
While Taylor was obliged to stay in the north and regroup, Johnson was near Monrovia and 
welcomed the ECOMOG troops to Liberia. 
Unlike many interim regimes, which are based on the principle that a transitional government 
must share power among all factions capable of spoiling the peace process, ECOMOG insisted 
that the resultant Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) could not include any of the 
warring parties in the country. As all the factions were discredited through their participation in the 
war, the logic was that the IGNU should remain untainted by association with these entities, and 
should instead constitute an impartial force to transition the country to a stable government. The 
international community, whether under the guise of ECOMOG or the UN, had no intention of 
running the Liberian government itself. 
Therefore, ECOMOG invited professor Amos Sawyer, former chairman of the 1981-4 Constitution 
Commission, to be president under the IGNU.[19] Sawyer used the security of the ECOMOG 
zone to try to re-kindle debate and dialogue on a new plane of constitutional reconstruction. Two 
attempts resulted in regional, multilateral conferences (Cotonou, 1993; Akosombo, 1994), but 
Sawyer’s efforts re-establish public trust through a credible democratic process and the 
involvement of Taylor (outside the zone of ECOMOG) were continuously rebuffed. As months 
extended to years, the discipline of ECOMOG failed to deliver anything but minimal security, 
which further hurt the legitimacy of the IGNU in the eyes of Liberians. The country was awash in 
armed gangs, so that the situation did not seem different from governance under Doe. Unable to 
forge a stable coalition, Sawyer eventually gave up his efforts to establish a new, more 
democratic order in 1994. 
Taylor was relentless in his ambition, and managed to mobilize support by forging commercial 
alliances with local interests that had international market outlets. Over time he became the 
broker with the international connections needed by the small holders of local resources. Taylor 
did everything he could with his NPFL to create alliances of opportunity, capture resources and 
use those to mobilize others. Ultimately, however, what he really needed to consolidate his power 
was to somehow become the President of sovereign Liberia. In that regard he charmed regional 
leaders from Cote D’Ivoire to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), convincing them that he 
could bring order and peace to Liberia. Through his ULAA network Taylor impressed a number of 
American leaders, including Jimmy Carter, that he was a democrat who could forge a regional 
peace if Carter would help him with the Nigerians. 
Although the Nigerians had never favored capitulation to a Charles Taylor power grab, by 1995 
ECOMOG was facing great frustration in the field as morale dropped, casualties rose (to 500 in 
the end), other national contingents grew unreliable, and locals accused them of looting and other 
behavior similar to those of the armed gangs (so much so that among locals, the acronym 
ECOMOG came to be understood as “every car or movable object gone”). Moreover, Nigerians at 
home were increasingly unhappy with the open ended engagement and the drain on 
resources.[20] The Sani Abacha government was getting concerned about the standoff and the 
loss to prestige if Nigeria were to withdraw with no new institutional outcome. Therefore, Nigeria 
mounted a peace conference at Abuja in 1995 to which Taylor was invited as a major participant. 
This led to a second one a year later at which ECOWAS heads of state blessed an accord with a 
transitional government to last until presidential and parliamentary elections in July of 1997. 
Charles Taylor, remarkably, got the sovereignty he sought by winning the election decisively. In a 
thorough, plausible analysis of the election results in which Taylor’s National Patriotic Party (NPP, 
formed out of the original invasion force), garnered 75 per cent of the votes, David Harris 
concluded that “Taylor’s overwhelming victory most likely derived from a heady brew of electoral 
rules and irregularities, a huge campaign, a backbone of support, a divided and weak opposition, 
and his apparent dominance over the security question…”[21] This election result provided the 
basis for the ECOMOG forces to withdraw, and allowed the Nigerians some cover for their failed 
Pax Nigeriana. 
The next six years revealed the worst aspects of the warlord political economy. Taylor had many 
rivals and bitter enemies by the late 1990s. They raised their own militias against him, using 
outside resources where possible (e.g., from neighboring Guinea in the case of the Liberians 
United for Reconciliation and Democracy - LURD). The mobilization of children as combatants, 
paying them in drugs or through booty they could seize brought the worlds attention once again to 
hapless Liberia (and Sierra Leone where limbs were being chopped off by Sankoh’s RUF). By 
2003 the irregular forces of LURD and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), made 
up of anti-Taylor dissidents and Liberians returning from refuge in the neighboring states, were 
challenging Taylor and his increasingly fragmented supporters on the outskirts of Monrovia. 
At this point in time, Liberia resembled many modern instances of civil war situations: there was 
no longer a Liberian government as that term is normally understood. No external force had 
intervened to protect the “government” from disintegration, and the civil service crumbled as 
unpaid government employees descended into survival mode like everyone else. What was new 
in this case was that, to some extent, the inversion of the state was intentional. In what has come 
to be termed a “warlord state,” government came to exist solely to extract productive resources 
and to distribute them amongst the ruling group’s members, rather than to provide security and 
services to the population at large. The government existed to control economic resources, 
paying little attention to anything else. In the warlord state, functional ministries no longer existed. 
Somebody in Taylor’s entourage might have been the minister of finance or agriculture, but the 
minister had no competent staff or necessarily any experience in administration of the portfolio. 
The “cabinet” had no bureaucracy, nor in the end were the combatants themselves being paid. 
Taylor admitted that his people “paid themselves” with what they could take. 
As dead bodies were piled up in front of the US Embassy in Monrovia as a symbol of total chaos 
and a plea for the Americans to intervene in August of 2003, a peace accord was forged among 
the warring factions in Accra, Ghana. To avoid facing a new international military force and 
appearing in an international criminal court, Taylor accepted exile in Nigeria. A new ECOMOG 
contingent was mobilized under a United Nations Peacekeeping mandate, and a Special UN 
Representative began to restore order. Thus began the third interim regime. 
Before moving to an assessment of this latest interim government, we summarize the conditions 
of state failure in post-Cold War Sub-Saharan Africa which allowed warlord alternative to emerge.  
· First, the internal features of Cold War-era patron-client politics translate into 
vulnerabilities for rulers amid increasing external pressures from donors and creditors for 
reforms, both political and economic (viz., structural adjustment, market liberalization, 
privatization, civil society, etc.).  
· Second, weak, patrimonial states are unable to implement policies that would re-structure 
the economy to launch it on a liberal-rational path. Without the Great Power rivalry to 
justify continued opportunistic support, domestic economies deteriorate amidst the 
demands of creditors and business-as-usual elite corruption.  
· Third, weak-state leaders develop new strategies for converting patronage politics into 
“warlord politics,” e.g., using private militias, whether domestic or external, to seize and 
exploit resources in the state. These “commercial partnerships” essentially replace the 
Cold War bureaucratic state.  
· Other strong-man competitors translate entrepreneurship into informal political authority.  
· Alliances are temporary and know no borders; in fact, the hallmark of warlord politics are 
the cross-border alliances that provide rebel movements safe havens in neighboring 
territories.  
· Finally, weak states reveal a new organization of global capital that exploits commercial 
opportunities previously out of reach. As these transactions cumulate the exercise of 
political authority is “almost indistinguishable from private commercial operations.”[22]  
The Third Interim Government  
On August 18, 2003, the Government of Liberia (GOL), the Liberians United for Reconciliation 
and Democracy (LURD), The Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and the Political 
Parties signed a peace agreement in Accra, Ghana. The main provisions of the Accra 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (ACPA) included:[23]  
· ceasefire and monitoring;  
· an international Stabilization Force;  
· disengagement;  
· demobilization, disarmament, rehabilitation and reintegration;  
· security sector reforms: disbandment of irregulars, restructuring of the armed forces, 
structuring of the national police and other special security services;  
· the release of prisoners and abductees;  
· the establishment of an independent national commission on human rights;  
· the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation commission;  
· humanitarian relief;  
· the creation of a governance reform commission;  
· the creation of a contract and monopolies commission;  
· electoral reform and new elections in October, 2005;  
· the founding of a National Transitional Government of Liberia consisting of an executive, 
a legislative assembly and a judiciary. The primary responsibility of this government was 
to ensure the implementation of provisions of the peace agreement;  
· international assistance: a UN Special Representative, a consolidated UN Mission, and 
specific calls to ECOWAS, UN, AU, EU and the ICGL to mobilize resources for post-
conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction; and  
· assistance to refugees, displaced persons and other vulnerable groups, esp. women, 
children.  
All of these provisions preempt the provisions of the Constitution, Statutes and other laws of 
Liberia until January 2006 when they will be restored along with the installation of a newly elected 
government. The executing partnership of the NTGL is a broad coalition of external players: the 
United Nations, ECOWAS, the African Union, the European Union, the United States, the IMF 
and the World Bank (hereafter referred to as The Partners). This interim government, unlike the 
first two, has a much heavier international footprint. 
Peace First  
Restoring public order was the first priority in the summer/fall of 2003. A country -wide state of 
peace has gradually been achieved over the last twenty-four months. Initially ECOWAS 
established an “interposition” force, subsequently integrated into an International Stabilization 
Force under UN auspices (UNOMIL). The UN force is now 15,000 soldiers, the largest such UN 
peacekeeping force on the ground in the world. This force is to remain until both the UN Security 
Council and the elected government of Liberia, after January 1, 2006, determine otherwise. 
The disarmament and demobilization (DD) of the armed gangs has also made progress after a 
very rocky start in which the early weapons recovery effort backfired. This DD work continues as 
a delicate, piecemeal operation of identifying “leaders” of the youthful groups in the field, 
convincing them the war is over, offering opportunities for schooling and a better life. What they 
want, inevitably, is money. Money continues to be used in direct exchange for weapons. The 
danger is that most of the former combatants are essentially homeless, many are ill and the 
capacity of the RR program to place them in even a subsistence setting is limited.[24] 
Reforms under the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL)  
One of the main problems with the first transitional government had been that none of the armed 
elements in Liberia had any stake in the government. This time, the signatories to the transitional 
peace accord in August of 2003 were largely self-identified political stakeholders with militias, and 
the transitional government created in the accord guaranteed representation for these groups. 
While the various rivals agreed to the processes outlined in the document, implementation of the 
agreement invariably raised the unresolved distributive claims of those very signatories. This was 
assured by the formula by which numbers of seats in the transitional legislature are allocated to 
specific groups, e.g., LURD, MODEL, GOL, other political parties, counties, etc. Similarly, 
ministerial portfolios were allocated based on negotiations among the stakeholder groups. So, 
although the Transitional Chairman, Gyude Bryant, has no partisan past, the other players in the 
NTGL mirror the factional interests in place at the end of the war. 
Peace and security have been restored, but the political institutional “reforms” have not 
progressed in the past two years, beyond planning for the just completed October election. 
Former President/Professor Amos Sawyer expressed great reluctance about going ahead with 
the recent election because the contending factions have not really agreed to compromise on 
much of anything. New parties reflecting civil society organizations, new platforms, nationwide 
debates and discussions need to occur before an election is held that could actually be expected 
to launch the country on a new trajectory. Sawyer sees the “reform” path of neighboring Sierra 
Leone as a model not to be emulated. In fact he proposes a regional reform process since the 
institutional problems have been shown to be regional at every turn of events.[25] 
Similarly, there has been little progress in the reform of the economy. This is especially important 
for an assessment of the progress and pitfalls of the interim regime, since the warlordization of 
politics that tore apart the Liberian state in the first place was based on a desire to manipulate the 
country’s rich economic resources. The ACPA agreement put a premium on economic and fiscal 
management reforms that would address the endemic corruption of the warlord state. A Contract 
and Monopolies Commission (CMC) was established to “oversee activities of a contractual nature 
undertaken by the NTGL,” Article XVII.[26] External audits of the Central Bank of Liberia, the five 
principal state enterprises and economic investigations where necessary were to be undertaken 
as the Partners thought necessary if they were to continue to support the reform effort. 
At a meeting held in Copenhagen in May of 2005, the NTGL and its Partners “concluded that 
there should be a more robust approach to economic governance in Liberia, with immediate and 
firm remedial efforts.” Audits by Liberia’s AG financed by the European Commission “have shown 
serious mismanagement of pubic finances in several key revenue earning agencies,” noting “the 
unprecedented step taken by the ECOWAS for deployment of investigators and economic crime 
experts to study the situation and report back.”[27] In March 2005 a UN panel discovered that 
Liberian officials had signed a secret contract giving a European company a virtual monopoly on 
mining diamonds. The arrangement “had involved members of the transitional government…”[28] 
In the meantime the Partners agreed to a new Economic Governance Action Plan that outlines in 
some detail a rigorous implementation of sound economic and fiscal management, including  
· securing the revenue base from the SOEs and the Central Bank;  
· improving budgeting and expenditure management;  
· improving procurement practices;  
· establishing new judicial measures to control corruption;  
· requesting international assistance to be targeted at several key institutions, e.g., the 
Central Bank, the General Accounting Office, the Governance Reform Commission 
among others; and  
· parallel building of local capacity in these same institutions.  
The Partners agreed that the plan would be executed in the framework of the Results Focused 
Transition Framework that coordinates donor resources with national resources and will be 
replaced by an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy when the new government takes over in 
January 2006.  
This plan is facing several obstacles, however. First, it is being challenged by many Liberians at 
home and abroad as impinging on the country’s sovereignty. They do not feel ownership of the 
plan, as it was designed and pushed on the NGTL by its international overseers. They also 
believe that the plan puts too much weight on international agencies, ignoring the fact that there 
are many talented Liberian professionals of integrity who can be entrusted with these important 
economic institutions after the election. Second, the fact that little has really changed at the level 
of connections between the political class and local commercial interests, and that corruption still 
plagues the most central economic management institutions suggests the economic transition is 
incomplete. The Partners are telling the NTGL that they will not continue to support a new 
government if there is not more palpable progress in reforming the country’s economic 
management. 
Problems with economic reforms and the ongoing, if murky involvement of Taylor in exercising 
influence among his loyalists in and around the NTGL from his exile in Nigeria, mean that the 
October election and transition to a new government in January could be a recipe for a re-run of 
the recent past. 
Transitioning from Interim to Permanent Government  
A national election was held on October 11, 2005 for the offices of President and the ninety-four 
seats in the House of Representatives and the Senate. Most reports indicate that the 
administration of the election was sound and consistent across the country, which was a 
considerable feat when one factors in the terrible infrastructure conditions in the country (e.g., no 
reliable electric power even in the capital city). After ballot counting, the top two candidates 
among the twenty-two presidential hopefuls were Mr. George Weah, a former international 
football player, and Ms. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, a former finance minister and Africa region head of 
the UN Development Program. 
A runoff election took place on November 8, 2005, in which Johnson-Sirleaf got 59% of the vote. 
Weah’s party filed a complaint with the National Electoral Commission alleging fraud. After 
several weeks of investigation the NEC announced on December 16th that the “evidence 
adduced was not sufficient to constitute massive fraud.”[29] Confirming this outcome, George 
Weah met with President-elect Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf on December 17th to discuss a peaceful 
transition. The new government is expected to assume power in January 2006. 
Reflections on the State, Governance, Legitimacy  
What can we learn from twenty-five years of conflict in Liberia punctuated by four different 
transitional and/or interim governments? We must begin with whether the evident endemic 
instability since the early1980s puts into question the very “state-ness” of Liberia. Whatever one 
thinks of the pre-1980 party boss, patron-client system, the Republic of Liberia was regarded as a 
sovereign state. At the same time the claim to sovereignty was based on an historical 
construction, the legitimacy of which was beginning to be extended to the whole population only 
in the 1960s as Tubman extended the franchise and a homogeneous administrative system to the 
“countryside.” 
Other analysts like Amos Sawyer would argue that Liberia’s problem is not one of state 
sovereignty, but one of governance. He has argued for years that the governance problem is 
essentially one of over-centralization of the presidency, which occurred under Tubman’s long 
tenure. The fact that the President has so much power in Liberia makes it the single prize for 
those with political ambition. As a political scientist, activist and former interim president, Sawyer 
believes that an auspiciously designed decentralized or “polycentric” constitution can garner the 
legitimacy a national government would require.[30] 
At the same time the instability of the past twenty years could be said to have undermined the 
integrity of the state of Liberia, especially as one ponders the regional character of the conflict. 
Some analysts of the first ECOMOG venture (1990-96) describe the interim government as 
maintaining “the fiction that Liberia was still a state with Monrovia as the main actor.”[31] Visitors 
to Monrovia during that period easily missed the fact that they were in what today we would call 
the “green zone,” borrowing the concept developed in Iraq to refer to the narrow scope of territory 
controlled by a “national” government. In Liberia, the real center of gravity had passed into the 
hands of sub-state actors, with contenders setting up their own capitals around the country.[32] 
This debate about whether Liberia’s problems are principally those of state legitimacy or 
governance resolves in the implications of the “failed state.” Weak governance undermines the 
principle of sovereignty. “Weak …refers to state strength …meaning a lack of institutional 
capacity to implement and enforce policies, often driven by an underlying lack of legitimacy of the 
political system as a whole.”[33] 
What then have been the effects of the two respective ECOMOG/UN interventions in Liberia and 
their parallel interim governments with regard to re-establishing stability, governance and even 
legitimacy? Certainly the Pax Nigeriana underlying the first ECOMOG began as a genuine effort 
to assert regional leadership, but it was based on an underestimation of the scale and complexity 
of the task. ECOMOG was not really able to contain conflicts beyond a limited zone, was 
stretched by having to enter the Sierra Leonean theater as well, and faced test after test of 
rotating and dwindling, contingents from its regional ECOWAS partner countries. Sawyer’s interim 
government was unable to extend the dialogue and bring a peace settlement home despite heroic 
efforts mainly because Taylor was ultimately strong enough to resist any compromise. The 
election of 1997, handing Taylor “legitimate” power, was a shame to all concerned in that he 
continued to behave as a warlord rather than a statesman, e.g., selling diamonds to al Qaeda in 
2001.[34] 
The carnage of the 1997-2003 period brought back a different, more robust ECOMOG and a 
much more robust United Nations commitment. As recounted above, the warring parties made up 
the interim government, with the exception of the role of Executive Chairman of the Transition 
Government. Although peace was restored and up to 100,000 persons have been disarmed, the 
continued reports of corrupt practices regarding natural resources exports leaves the future very 
uncertain. 
The apparent determination of the external “Partners” described above to restore integrity to the 
economic management of Liberia is as much a test of the legitimacy of the new government and 
the effectiveness of the state as the election itself. Operating from outside Liberia’s borders, and 
with few concrete ties to the domestic economy, these international actors have been unable, so 
far, to force effective economic reforms on the country. Thus, the economic legitimacy that the 
interim government sorely needs is lacking. 
Political legitimacy seems to be scarce as well. The future might have been brighter if the interim 
government arrangements had provided for a full constitutional review and design to be ratified by 
the public before the UNOMIL mandate expired. Because of the configuration of the interim 
government that did not happen, and therefore the October election proceeded without the 
participation of new civil society groups and political parties. Interim governance in Liberia 
remained a top-down process, governed by the warring parties and the international community. 
The degree of domestic acceptance is still unknown, once the new, “permanent” government 
assumes power in January 2006, domestic evaluations may be easier to discern. Institutionally 
speaking, Liberia is mostly where it was in 1996, with the difference that over 200,000 people 
have died and everyone is exhausted. That is the only advantage this new government has in 
facing the future.  
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